With America in Shambles, Europe Must Become Less Risk Averse

Napoleon once offered that old chestnut to strategists who were too focused on victory to notice failure. But what if we aren’t talking about an enemy, but a temporarily addled ally?

All signs point to four years of chaos from the White House while existential threats—military, economic, and societal—mass on Europe’s borders. With all eyes on Wall Street, what must Europe do to protect Marszałkowska, the Champs-Élysées, and Unter den Linden?

Europe, in short, will have to stop waiting and start acting.

Failed States

America under Trump is a failed state—focused inward and committed by holy decree to nationalism and isolationism. The polarization seen across the country today, marked by ongoing protests in every state and major city, and today’s violent economic volatility, won’t end until at least the midterms—when the “silent majority” of Trumpist boomers and Gen Xers may finally go quiet for another decade.

Further, Trump’s tariffs and anti-globalist stance—while good for Fox News headlines—are straining the compacts the U.S. once maintained with the rest of the world. Foreign policy usually swings between administrations, but rarely has it gone to such extremes as it has under Trump 2. Like Orbán, Johnson, and Kaczyński before him, Trump is a nationalist leader whose ideas appeal to an uneducated minority. This leads to a weak commitment to NATO and transatlantic cooperation—and it will push the intelligent, or at least the business-savvy, to ignore the globe and focus inward.

Paralysis

Europe has spent decades shaping its policies around the assumption that the United States would always provide a stabilizing anchor. In security, energy, and technology, Washington has acted as both shield and engine. NATO, long funded and driven by the U.S., has allowed many European states to underinvest in their own defense. U.S. tech firms dominate Europe’s digital infrastructure. Even energy decisions—like the slow pivot away from Russian gas—often lagged behind American pressure rather than growing out of unified European planning.

Obviously, this is an exaggeration for effect. But what’s clear is that Europe has adopted a posture that’s fundamentally reactive. European leaders rarely make big moves unless Washington moves first. Even when U.S. choices are flawed or incoherent, there’s still reluctance to step out alone. Strategic autonomy is discussed but rarely pursued. The war in Ukraine should have triggered a permanent rethinking of defense and energy policy. Instead, there’s been a cautious—but increasingly frenzied—scramble to respond.

Part of the hesitation comes from internal structure. The EU isn’t built for fast or bold moves. Decision-making often stalls in endless rounds of consensus-building. Member states worry more about offending each other than projecting power abroad. In this environment, risk aversion isn’t just habit—it’s built into the machinery. But in a world that’s speeding up and shifting quickly, that machinery needs to change.

Fear of internal division is real, and very potent, when it comes to pan-European politics. At a time when every country must stand together, the old Euro habit of staying quiet until someone else pipes up is no longer enough.

DEDS

To remain viable, Europe must become purveyors of DEDS. It must invest in Defense, build a pan-European Economy, offer clear and unified Diplomacy, and adopt a shared Strategy focused on deterrence and risk-taking rather than staying on the back foot. In other words: DEDS.

If Europe wants to stop being reactive, it needs a real defense architecture of its own. That means moving beyond NATO dependency and building integrated military capabilities that aren’t just national but European. Shared procurement, joint command structures, and a clear chain of responsibility across borders would let Europe defend itself—with or without the U.S. This isn’t just about budgets. It’s about political will and clarity of purpose. A continent that can’t secure its own borders—or project force when needed—won’t be taken seriously.

On the economic front, dependence on external powers is just as dangerous. Europe needs to stop relying on U.S. tech platforms and global energy markets it doesn’t control. That means building real energy independence—especially in renewables—and creating space for homegrown tech firms to scale. Regulation is not enough. There needs to be investment, coordination, and a willingness to protect key industries from foreign takeovers. VC investment must also be realistic and focused on risk—not just conservative reward. Europe’s VC class has long shown a deep distrust of startups. That has to change. If Europe doesn’t take this seriously, it will keep bleeding value to foreign firms while its own innovation base erodes.

Startup innovation isn’t a luxury—it’s a necessity. Europe can’t wait for multinationals to solve its productivity problems or build the next generation of platforms. It needs small, fast-moving companies willing to test new models, build from scratch, and take bets that incumbents won’t. These companies create jobs, pressure legacy players to adapt, and generate tech that strengthens both public infrastructure and private markets. But they need space to breathe. That means fewer bureaucratic hurdles, faster access to funding, and real incentives to build in Europe, not in Delaware or Singapore.

The U.S. has long had an edge in turning research into commercial success. Europe has the talent and the research output, but it lags in translating that into competitive companies. Fixing that gap isn’t about copying Silicon Valley—it’s about recognizing the local advantages and building a funding and regulatory environment that supports them. A strong internal market, high-quality public services, and cross-border access to customers are all underutilized assets. But those advantages will mean little if startups can’t get capital without giving up control or relocating abroad.

If the EU wants real economic sovereignty, it needs to treat innovation as a matter of strategic interest. That means giving startups a seat at the table when industrial policy is made—not just the usual consortiums and incumbents. Defense, energy, and digital infrastructure all depend on new tech. And new tech depends on letting people build without waiting five years for approval. The longer Europe waits, the more it cedes ground—not just to the U.S., but to authoritarian states that know how to move fast.

Diplomatically, Europe often speaks in too many voices at once. When it does reach consensus, it tends to hedge. But in a world of power politics, vague statements don’t count. Europe needs to act as a bloc—not just on trade but on foreign policy. That means naming adversaries when necessary, building bilateral relationships beyond the West, and setting clear red lines—even if the U.S. disagrees. Autonomy doesn’t mean antagonism, but it does require Europe to stop outsourcing its worldview.

Finally, Europe needs a real strategy for when the U.S. either won’t act or acts against European interests. That’s no longer a theoretical risk. Recent U.S. administrations have shown that alliances can be ignored, treaties torn up, and long-term goals replaced by short-term chaos. A strategic Europe would prepare for that. It would build networks with other regions, invest in deterrence, and stop assuming that Washington will always pick up the phone. Less risk aversion doesn’t mean recklessness. It means being ready to act without asking permission.

The U.S. is now a structural problem to solve—and it is best solved from within. Europe’s best friend, or worst bully, is no longer a reliable factor. Relying on the failed economists and TV presenters running the Trump administration is suicide, while China and Russia will be the only beneficiaries of a dawdling Europe.

Europe cannot afford to wait for America to get its act together. To paraphrase Napoleon: always rethink your strategy when your friend is making a mistake. It is, at this point, the least Europe can do.