In the build-up to the Munich Security Conference (MSC), I finally read a book many had recommended. Carlo Masala’s ‘If Russia Wins’ is not simply a geopolitical thriller. It is a sharp warning to the West – a warning that reverberated through the MSC in soundbites and narratives.
The novel imagines a near-future scenario where, after securing a form of “peace” in Ukraine, Russia tests NATO by seizing the Estonian city of Narva and the island of Hiiumaa in 2028. Masala’s central message is unequivocal: Western complacency is a strategic liability, and deterrence only works when it is underpinned by political will, industrial capacity, and societal resilience.
For the UK and Europe, the book’s scenario acts as a stress test of current assumptions. It forces a confrontation with the gap between rhetoric and capability, highlighting the uncomfortable reality that adversaries exploit hesitation and uncertainty.
This article distils Masala’s cautionary tale into three domains: public policy, the role of private and venture capital, and continental willingness to deter aggression.
The key messages from the MSC find a chilling echo in the novel. Both the conference and the book analyse a world where the post-1945 order has collapsed, replaced by a “multi- polarisation” that favours aggression over international law.
The ultimate conclusion of both the conference and the novel is that the peace Europeans take for granted is “contingent and fragile.” Inaction is no longer an option; survival requires immediate, decisive strategic effort rather than “complacent dialogue.”
Policy lessons: deterrence requires urgency, not incrementalism
In Masala’s scenario, Europe and the US relax after a so-called “peace deal” in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia quietly rebuilds its military strength, exploiting the cyclical nature of Western defence attention, leveraging its alliance with China, exasperating migrant crises and executing sweeping cyber-attacks and grey zone acts. There are several key policy implications:
- Defence spending must be sustained, not episodic: Europe’s slow rearmament and compromised military and intelligence capabilities are cited as vulnerabilities that Russia exploits. This demands multi-year defence budgets insulated from political cycles, binding commitments to ammunition stockpiles and industrial capacity, and a shift from boutique procurement to scalable, rapid-production systems.
- European leaders at MSC, notably Ursula von der Leyen, argued that Europe must become “independent in every dimension” to survive. The novel argues for this exact independence. It illustrates how a complacent Europe that fails to rearm is quickly outmanoeuvred by Russian hybrid warfare.
- NATO’s Article 5 credibility must be reinforced: The scenario in the novel hinges on whether NATO would risk nuclear escalation to defend Estonia. At MSC, there were urgent calls to build a “European Army” and even a European nuclear umbrella. For the UK and Europe, this means clearer red lines communicated publicly, forward deployment of forces in the Baltics and High North, integrated air and missile defence across the continent, and a political culture that treats collective defence as non-negotiable.
- Europe must prepare for a long-term confrontation. A significant cultural shift is required. Policy must instead assume Russia will remain revisionist for decades; deterrence is a permanent condition, not a temporary surge; and hybrid threats across cyber, energy and disinformation, require whole-of-society resilience.
Private and venture capital: Europe needs a defence tech renaissance
One of the most overlooked lessons from If Russia Wins is that deterrence in the 21st century is as much an industrial and financial challenge as a military one. Masala’s scenario does not hinge on technological surprise, but on speed, scale, and endurance: Russia rebuilds its military capacity faster than Western policymakers expect, while Europe’s defence ecosystem remains fragmented, under-capitalised, and slow to adapt.
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that modern deterrence depends not only on traditional military hardware but on technological innovations: unmanned systems, AI-enabled targeting, secure communications, cyber defence, satellite intelligence, and agile manufacturing. These are domains where startups and private capital can outperform traditional defence contractors.
Sovereign funds have a chance to play a transformative role:
- Sovereign funds should act as catalysts, not substitutes, for private capital (this is largely the model my previous organisation, the National Security Strategic Investment Fund, pursued). A sovereign fund’s role is not to crowd out markets, but to shape them: absorbing early technical and political risk, anchoring demand, and signalling long-term state commitment.
- When structured correctly, these funds lower the cost of risk for private investors, transform defence innovation into an investable asset class, and accelerate the transition from prototype to production. This is the core lesson from the US ecosystem: not the scale of DARPA or DIU funding, but their ability to align government demand, capital markets, and industrial capacity around shared strategic objectives.
- European institutions, from national development banks (KfW, British Business Bank, EIFO amongst others) to EU-level instruments (i.e. the European Investment Fund), must play this role deliberately. That means faster decision making, clearer pathways for a range of capital providers, and capital deployed with a bias toward speed and scale rather than consensus and process.
- Ultimately, deterrence rests on credibility. That credibility is eroded when production lines are slow, supply chains fragile, and innovation trapped in laboratories rather than deployed in units. Masala’s warning is clear: adversaries do not wait for committees or funding cycles.
- A European defence-tech renaissance is therefore not optional. It is the financial and industrial foundation of deterrence itself. Without mobilising private capital, guided and catalysed by sovereign innovation funds, Europe risks entering a prolonged confrontation with the wrong tools, at the wrong speed, and at unacceptable strategic cost.
Deterrence faces a psychological gap
Perhaps the most profound lesson of ‘If Russia Wins’ is not military but psychological. Masala argues that Western societies have grown accustomed to peace and assume escalation will be avoided because “everything turns out well in the end.”
This mindset is not benign. It is legible to adversaries and it erodes deterrence at its foundation.
Deterrence functions first in the mind of the opponent. It rests not only on capability, but on the perceived willingness to bear risk, absorb cost, and act decisively under pressure.
In Masala’s scenario, Russia does not exploit Western weakness through overwhelming force, but through calibrated provocation; testing whether hesitation, fear of escalation, or domestic political discomfort will paralyse decision-making. The danger lies not in miscalculation, but in accurate calculation.
What Must Change
Europe must rediscover strategic seriousness: Deterrence is not only about weapons, but also about credibility. If adversaries believe Europe will hesitate, they will probe and exploit that reluctance.
Societies must understand the stakes: Masala’s scenario shows how quickly a crisis can escalate when the public is unprepared for sacrifice or risk.
Governments must communicate openly about threats, build public support for defence spending, and integrate civil defence and resilience planning.
The recent letter published by the UK Chief of the Defence Staff and his German counterpart provides a good example of collaboration, highlighting the “moral” imperative for rearming against the threat of Russia.
The UK plays a dual role as a bridge and a backbone. Post-Brexit, the UK remains a potent military power with capabilities that partners value. The scenario underscores the need for deeper UK-EU defence coordination, UK leadership in the High North and Baltic deterrence, joint procurement and industrial cooperation as a policy that makes sense for both prosperity and security reasons.
The UK cannot deter alone, and Europe is weaker without the UK.
Carlo Masala’s ‘If Russia Wins’ is not a prophecy; it is a warning. It shows that deterrence does not fail suddenly, but gradually, through complacency, underinvestment, and the quiet erosion of political will. The novel’s power lies in its plausibility: nothing extraordinary is required for the scenario to unfold, only the continuation of today’s habits.
For the UK and Europe, the implications are stark. Security can no longer be treated as a cyclical policy priority or an abstract moral stance. It is an industrial, financial, and societal project that must be sustained over decades. Policy must move from reaction to anticipation; defence innovation must be treated as a strategic necessity rather than a political inconvenience; and private capital must be mobilised as a core pillar of deterrence, not a peripheral actor.
Above all, Europe must confront the psychological dimension of deterrence. Peace is not self-sustaining, and stability is not guaranteed by dialogue alone. Credibility rests on readiness: military, industrial, and societal. If adversaries believe Europe will hesitate, they will test its resolve. If Europe demonstrates clarity, capability, and cohesion, deterrence holds.
The future Masala describes is not inevitable. But avoiding it requires deliberate choices made now: to invest, to coordinate, and to prepare societies for a more contested world. The question, then, is not whether Europe can afford to act, but whether it can afford not to. If these lessons are heeded, If Russia Wins will remain a hypothetical. If they are ignored, it risks becoming a headline.
Hugo Jammes is the co- founder of EDT Ventures. He previously ran the investment arm of the UK National Security Strategic Investment Fund (NSSIF). Prior to this, Hugo worked in investment banking and started his career as a professional soldier in the British Military.
