Europe’s reliance on external technology and infrastructure faces growing scrutiny, as policymakers and industry leaders confront the risks of depending on systems built and controlled from the other side of the world.
Governments are taking steps to limit exposure to US technology providers, while regulators and industry groups push for stricter definitions of what counts as “sovereign” infrastructure. And France recently announced that it’s moving sensitive health data away from Microsoft to a domestic provider, part of a broader effort to bring critical systems under local control.
Now a report spearheaded by climate tech venture capital firm World Fund, with contributions from NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) and Kaya Partners, pits that same concern at the centre of a broader economic argument, casting Europe’s exposure across energy, industry, critical materials and compute as both a vulnerability and a market opportunity.
The report revolves around the concept of “power,” which in this context extends beyond energy to include industrial capacity, technological capability and security — the systems that once underpinned Europe’s industrial strength, but have eroded over time, yet remain central to economic strength
“A powerful Europe is leading in core technologies of this era and is, by definition, a secure and decarbonised one,” Daria Saharova, Managing Partner at World Fund, said in a statement issued to Resilience Media. “We have the research and the talent, but our funding remains far too shallow compared to the US. It’s time to stop managing decline and start financing leadership.”
A system built on dependencies
The report, titled Europe’s Power Play, argues that decades of prioritising efficiency and global integration have left Europe reliant on imported energy, foreign-controlled supply chains and non-European digital infrastructure.
The report notes:
Cheap Russian gas, outsourced manufacturing in China, and reliance on the American security umbrella were all consequences of that model. Together, they weakened Europe’s industrial base, increased its external dependencies, and reduced its ability to shape events rather than react to them.
This model proved effective in more stable periods, but its vulnerabilities have been exposed by China’s tightening grip on critical supply chains and geopolitical shocks such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and renewed instability in the Middle East.
Those dependencies are visible across myriad sectors. Europe still imports the majority of its energy, for example, while its share of global data centre capacity has slipped from more than 25% in 2015 to around 15% in 2024, according to the International Energy Agency.
At the same time, industry leaders have warned that the region risks falling further behind the United States and China in building the infrastructure needed for artificial intelligence.
These trends point to a broader issue about who controls the systems Europe depends on. World Fund’s report, specifically, places energy, industrial capacity, access to materials and computing infrastructure within a single framework, arguing that these sectors form the foundations of economic and geopolitical strength.
A $35 trillion opportunity?
The report estimates that these “power-critical” sectors could represent a combined $35 trillion global market by 2030. The figure draws on aggregated projections of large, existing industries — including a $12 trillion energy market and a $19 trillion manufacturing sector. As a result, it reflects the scale of those sectors rather than suggesting this figure represents a fully addressable opportunity.
Danijel Visevic, a general partner at World Fund, said the figure should be read as a measure of transformation, rather than a fixed pool already controlled by incumbents.
“These markets are not static blocks owned by incumbents — many are undergoing their most fundamental transformation in generations, which is creating openings for new entrants,” Visevic explained to Resilience Media over email. “European players have natural advantages in several areas, from energy systems to critical materials and compute. In our view, the opportunity here is generational, and the constraint is capital, not addressability.”
Demand for home-grown technologies and infrastructure is already being driven by European incumbents seeking to secure supply chains and maintain competitiveness. This is evidenced by European companies increasing investment in domestic technologies, with Porsche and Bosch backing Germany-based battery recycling company Cylib to secure access to critical materials. Elsewhere, Airbus has invested in Quantum Systems for aerial intelligence, and SAP has partnered with Mistral AI on European AI cloud services.
Demand is also showing up more directly in energy markets. The UK’s Octopus Energy, which recently announced plans to spin out its Kraken technology platform in a deal valuing the business at $8.65 billion, has said it has seen a 50% increase in solar panel sales following the Iran conflict, as households respond to rising energy prices.
‘The time to act is now’
If the report’s diagnosis centres on dependence, its response focuses on where capital and policy should move next.
First, it calls for a big increase in venture capital to support the commercialisation of European research, arguing that funding levels remain well below those in the United States.
Second, it points to policy bottlenecks, including permitting timelines and procurement processes, which it says slow deployment of new technologies.
Third, it urges governments and investors to prioritise sectors that underpin energy supply, industrial production, materials processing and computing infrastructure.
These proposals reflect a much wider shift in European policy debates, where control over infrastructure is increasingly tied to economic security — a point echoed by EU officials calling for greater control over key technologies.
The report stops short of predicting how quickly Europe can reduce its reliance on external systems. After all, many of the dependencies it identifies are deeply embedded, from global supply chains to cloud computing platforms dominated by a handful of providers.
Asked how quickly that exposure can realistically be reduced, Visevic said timelines vary significantly across sectors.
“Energy supply mix likely has the shortest timeline for exposure reduction, with renewables deployable on three- to five-year cycles, while battery recycling can scale on a similar timeline,” Visevic said. “Industrial capacity and advanced manufacturing will take longer, but a decade may be enough to rebuild a competitive base. Critical materials processing and leading-edge compute are longer-cycle challenges, and Europe is unlikely to achieve full parity in these areas by 2035.”
Even so, the report argues that the pace of technological change leaves little room for delay, noting that the “time to act is now.” That tension between long-term structural change and near-term urgency, the report suggests, is shaping where investment is directed.
“What Europe can build is sovereign capacity in the strategic slices that matter most – which is precisely where venture capital should be concentrated now,” Visevic added.
