Aleksander Olech, editor-in-chief of Defence24.com, has spent the past few years tracking what feels less like a series of incidents and more like a steady campaign. His outlet focuses on Poland and Central Europe, a region that now sits at the center of pressure tied to the war in Ukraine. In a recent report, Olech and his team map what they describe as a pattern of hybrid operations aimed at Poland, a mix of arson, sabotage, cyberattacks, and pressure on migration routes, all carried out below the threshold of open conflict. This so-called hybrid warfare consists of attacks that are highly non-traditional and, more importantly, not attributable to any one enemy.
The report argues that these are not isolated acts. They form a sustained effort to test Poland’s resilience and to strain its role as a logistical hub for Ukraine since 2022, when support flows began moving heavily through Polish territory.
I spoke with Olech about the report, his methodology, and what he sees on the ground. We discussed how these operations work in practice, often deniable, often indirect, but consistent in their aim to disrupt and unsettle. We also talked about what comes next. His view is direct: Poland is already living in a kind of pre-conflict phase, one that demands a response before it turns into something harder to contain.
Resilience: Why is hybrid warfare so popular now?
Olech: Because there is no clear response to it. Hybrid warfare operates below the threshold that would trigger a direct military reaction. In practice, there is defence, but very limited offensive response. This creates space for Russia to act with relative freedom. Russia is showing that could wound and harm a NATO & EU countries. The Kremlin is boasting about the capabilities in malicious activities against the Transatlantic Alliance.
Olech: Because there is no clear response to it. Hybrid warfare operates below the threshold that would trigger a direct military reaction. In practice, there is defence, but very limited offensive response. This creates space for Russia to act with relative freedom. Russia is showing that could wound and harm a NATO & EU countries. The Kremlin is boasting about the capabilities in malicious activities against the Transatlantic Alliance.
If we speak about offensive elements, they are indirect. For example, supporting Ukraine with weapons that allow it to strike Russian targets, conducting joint cyber operations with allies, or organising large-scale military exercises near Russia and Belarus to demonstrate capabilities. These actions matter, but they are not direct responses in the same domain as hybrid attacks. This asymmetry makes hybrid warfare attractive. It is low-cost, scalable and difficult to deter in a traditional sense.
R: What is next in hybrid warfare?
O: The next phase will involve further expansion and adaptation. Russia will increasingly rely on proxy actors—using citizens of other countries, criminal networks or individuals with unclear affiliations. This complicates attribution and response even further. At the same time, Russia will try to reshape the strategic environment. One possible scenario is a situation where Moscow pushes for a form of settlement or pause in Ukraine, while continuing and even intensifying hybrid operations against NATO and EU countries. This would allow Russia to claim de-escalation in one domain while maintaining pressure in another.
O: The next phase will involve further expansion and adaptation. Russia will increasingly rely on proxy actors—using citizens of other countries, criminal networks or individuals with unclear affiliations. This complicates attribution and response even further. At the same time, Russia will try to reshape the strategic environment. One possible scenario is a situation where Moscow pushes for a form of settlement or pause in Ukraine, while continuing and even intensifying hybrid operations against NATO and EU countries. This would allow Russia to claim de-escalation in one domain while maintaining pressure in another.
We will also see deeper penetration into non-traditional areas: local infrastructure, digital ecosystems, data, and social structures. Hybrid warfare will continue to blur the line between internal and external security. The key point is that Poland—and Europe more broadly—must treat hybrid threats as a permanent condition, not a temporary phase. Adaptation, resilience and coordination will be more important than ever, because this form of conflict is not going away.
R: What should the average Pole be doing to prevent disinformation and protect themselves from hybrid warfare?
O: First of all, we need to understand that hybrid warfare is not something abstract or limited to intelligence services—it directly involves society. Every citizen is part of the security system. The basic level is awareness: verifying sources, not reacting emotionally to content, and understanding that disinformation is designed to exploit fear, anger and division.
At the same time, there is a systemic challenge in Poland. The state is trying to introduce programmes aimed at countering disinformation, but so far their effectiveness remains limited. A major problem is the internal political conflict, which weakens coherence and creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited from the outside. This is particularly important in the context of upcoming parliamentary elections next year, especially given the current cohabitation. In such an environment, fact-checking organisations are becoming more active, but their impact is still uneven.
There is also a positive trend. Think tanks, NGOs and expert communities in Poland are developing rapidly and playing an increasingly important role in building resilience. However, this must be matched by broader societal engagement. Without a more unified approach at the political level, even the best initiatives will remain insufficient.
R: How bad will this get and what is the expected outcome?
O: We should assume that hybrid threats will intensify. Russia is already increasing the scale and complexity of its operations, and this trend will continue. What is important is that many actions which ten years ago would have been clearly classified as acts of war—drone incursions, sabotage of infrastructure, arson, assassination attempts, railway disruptions or airspace violations—are now treated as elements of hybrid warfare.
O: We should assume that hybrid threats will intensify. Russia is already increasing the scale and complexity of its operations, and this trend will continue. What is important is that many actions which ten years ago would have been clearly classified as acts of war—drone incursions, sabotage of infrastructure, arson, assassination attempts, railway disruptions or airspace violations—are now treated as elements of hybrid warfare.
The expected outcome is not a single decisive result, but a gradual process. Russia aims to weaken societies, create internal divisions, undermine trust in institutions and complicate decision-making processes. This is a long-term strategy based on pressure, not on a quick victory. Russia will simply increase the number of hybrid attacks.
